Tuesday, December 2, 2014

Korean mortgages reveal tactical shift

First published in The Korea Herald.

A lot has been written in recent months about Korea’s soaring household debt and its implications for the economy. Many experts seem to agree that the country is staring at a catastrophe waiting to happen, and call for the debt to be reined in if the country has to strengthen its economic fundamentals.

Bank of Korea Governor Lee Ju-yeol is also of the view that efforts need to be made to control the growth of household debt, as it may dampen consumer spending ― even though the central bank’s decision to cut interest rates in August and October has indirectly promoted its growth.

In the face of all this, Finance Minister Choi Kyung-hwan has stated that an increase in household debt would have a “limited” impact on the economy and the focus should be on reinvigorating the sluggish economy.

As of end-September, the latest Bank of Korea data showed that outstanding credit to households by financial institutions, including commercial lenders, insurers and financial agencies, stood at 1,060.3 trillion won ($960 billion), with total loans registering 1,002.9 trillion won, of which mortgage loans alone accounted for a whopping 445.2 trillion won. If you add up mortgage loans by Korea Housing Finance Corporation and the National Housing Fund, it amounts to 480.9 trillion won.

Not surprisingly, experts have come out against the government decision to relax the real estate policies, which has led to a rise in household loans, saying that it is like adding fuel to fire.

In end-July, the government lowered hurdles for property purchases, as part of a stimulus package aimed at spurring economic growth, which fell in the second quarter to the slowest pace since early last year, loosening caps that were imposed in the mid-2000s when the property market was booming.

It reset the loan-to-value ratio, a gauge of loan size to the underlying collateral, to a uniform 70 percent, from between 50 and 85 percent depending on region; and at the same time, the debt-to-income ratio, which measures a borrower’s ability to repay, became 60 percent across the country, as against 50-65 percent previously.

To top off these measures, it also announced real estate deregulation measures, which included easing reconstruction of old apartments and lessening the supply of new homes.

Critics say the government’s policies will actually increase household debt in the long term and stifle domestic demand, as they encourage households to stack up higher debts. When delinquency rates rise and housing prices fall, it will trigger distressed sales for repayments, which will apply additional downward pressure on asset prices, creating a vicious cycle leading to debt deflation.

As of now, it is too soon to predict the impact of these measures, but the household loans are certainly not expected to decline anytime in the near future.

Many economists are concerned that the massive household debt problems will negatively and significantly affect economic growth, with many doubting the effectiveness of countermeasures, as excessive borrowing could discourage spending.

It could of course be a nonissue if Korea acts quickly to boost economic growth and makes household income rise faster than debt, which is what the government is trying to do.

Amid all this noise the financial regulator, the Financial Services Commission, has underplayed the doubts, saying that the quality of debt is improving. It cited the shift in the type of institutions from which people are borrowing. Those who previously would have had no other choice than to borrow from nonbanking financial companies at higher interest rates have mostly changed course to apply for loans at banks due to the relaxed regulations. That lowers the financial burden of interest payments, reducing the overall risk of defaults.

Is this really the case?

Let us take a look at the household credit data that was released by the BOK on Nov. 25. If we look at the two-month period before the housing mortgage rules were eased and two months after, there seems to some movement in that direction.

In June-July bank lending to households was 6.5 trillion won while nonbank lending was 5.1 trillion won. In the August-September period, banking lending was higher at 9.3 trillion won, while nonbank lending was lower at 2.6 trillion won. In other words, bank lending grew by 43 percent and nonbank lending fell by 49 percent. There is merit to what the FSC has been saying, something that has been lost in the din raised by critics.

Moreover, even the case of debt deflation that the experts are concerned about is not happening. Recent data shows that housing prices have been increasing since the new rules came into force.

The Land Ministry has noted that the number of home transactions reached an eight-year high of 108,721 in October, spiking 20.4 percent from a year earlier. Also reflecting an apparent recovery in the real estate market, the number of groundbreakings for housing construction jumped 53.9 percent on-year to 60,085 last month.

As they say, there are two sides to every coin. There is no doubt that the government should keep a watch on the growth in household debt and step in immediately when there are signs of a problem. But clearly as of now, one should not jump to conclusions just on the basis of the absolute figures for household loans.

I think it is premature to suggest that Korea is staring at a crisis. The household debt issue should be considered in the context of the households’ ability to repay.

With the tactical shift in housing loans from the insecure nonbanking sector to the more secure banking sector, there seems to be less risk of widespread default.

The biggest risk is a sharp fall in residential property prices. Korean households have more than 80 percent of their assets in real estate. It is expected that the recovery of the real estate market will boost domestic demand and household income, which may eventually solve many fundamental problems.

In any case, the country has the means and experience to deal with a banking crisis. The saving grace: history has endowed Korea with a legacy of distortions in its credit system, which has taken time and a few crises to resolve. Today, its financial system is more mature and less prone to such crises than before.

Also, basic tools to manage household debt are already in place ― for example, the “Measures to Enable Soft-Landing of Household Debt” (June 2011) and “Measures to Promote Structural Soundness of Household Debt” (February 2014).

This is not to suggest that there will not be a problem. But we should be confident that the government will adequately manage the risk factors, if any, of household debt.

Sunday, November 23, 2014

Win-win regional trade pact choices for Korea

First published in The Korea Herald.

After dillydallying for several years, China has thrown the cat among the pigeons by aggressively pushing for the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific at the recently concluded APEC summit in Beijing.

Threatened by China’s urgency, the United States, which has been driving its own Trans-Pacific Partnership minus China, was seen making backroom maneuvers to dilute any reference to the FTAAP in the Leaders’ Declaration. It did manage to take out the deadline of 2025 that was in the draft and what was finally released had no real specifics, except that a collective feasibility study will be concluded by 2016. 

The final declaration noted: “we decide to accelerate our efforts on realizing the FTAAP on the basis of the conclusion of the ongoing pathways, and affirm our commitment to the eventual realization of the FTAAP as early as possible by building on ongoing regional undertakings, which will contribute significantly to regional economic integration, sustained growth and common prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.”

The idea of creating the FTAAP has been discussed for many years at the annual APEC gatherings, but it is only recently that China has stepped up diplomatic efforts. It would not be wrong to say that it wants to assert its economic clout and neutralize the U.S.’ efforts to forge the TPP in its own backyard.

“Having reached an important consensus on starting the FTAAP process ... What we should do now is translate the consensus into action,” Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his speech at the opening session of the summit on Nov. 11.

Just a day earlier, U.S. President Barack Obama expressed his desire to make the TPP a reality. “We’re going to keep on working to get it done,” he said, describing it as “the model for trade in the 21st century.”

While the two countries battle it out for influence, another regional trade agreement is slowly making progress ― the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

The three RTAs ― the FTAAP, TTP and RCEP ― are all focused on the Asia-Pacific region. 

APEC ― comprised of 21 member states including China and the U.S. ― first formally began discussing the concept of the FTAAP at the 2006 Hanoi summit, although proposals for such an agreement have been around for a long time. In 2010, APEC leaders issued its “Pathways to FTAAP,” and instructed members to take concrete steps toward the realization of the RTA.

Over the past several years, members have discussed a broad range of issues relevant to the prospects for the deal, conducted analytical work, addressed a number of next-generation trade and investment issues, and undertaken sectoral initiatives. However, China was not really keen to push ahead with the deal.

Sensing this, in November 2011 the U.S and eight other countries (Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, the U.S., Australia, Peru and Vietnam) formally announced the TPP, which is intended to “enhance trade and investment among the partner countries, to promote innovation, economic growth and development, and to support the creation and retention of jobs.”

Malaysia officially joined in October 2010, Canada and Mexico in October 2012, and Japan in July 2013.

So far 20 formal rounds of TPP negotiations have been held. However, the members have been unable to reach a consensus on a number of contentious issues like intellectual property and the liberalization of agricultural markets. Adding to this, the U.S. could not make forward progress because of political difficulties at home regarding the passage of a Trade Promotion Authority by Congress. Perhaps this is why China is suddenly showing interest in the FTAAP.

As for the RCEP, it is a proposed trade deal between 10 ASEAN member states: Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.

It was announced at the 19th ASEAN Summit in November 2011, and negotiations began a year later, aimed at concluding talks by end-2015. The sixth round of negotiations are due to take place in New Delhi in the first week of December. It remains to be seen whether the negotiations will be successful and the targeted deadline reached, which at present seems unlikely. 

So, where does that leave Korea in the grand scheme of things?

It is already a part of the FTAAP and RCEP, and has also expressed its interest in joining the TPP. While the two largest economies fight it out for dominance, Korea can gain by participating in all three RTAs. Even if one of them falls by the wayside, it has nothing to lose. Being an export-driven economy, it has already been actively pursuing FTAs with its biggest trading partners, and has made quite a few notable achievements.

It makes sense for Korea to ask to join the TPP as soon as possible, instead of sitting on the fence because of its bilateral issues with Japan. The country can pursue the TPP side by side with other RTAs since they are mostly complementary and will only reinforce each other.

Come to think of it, all three RTAs are quite different in scope. Experts have noted that the TPP deal is likely to be much more substantial in terms of depth of prospective trade liberalization and rule-making obligations compared to the other two. It includes stipulations for labor and environmental protection, intellectual property protection and rules for state-owned enterprises.

Compared to the TPP, the standards and degree of liberalization sought in the RCEP are low. The founding document states: “individual and diverse circumstances” of its members, and provisions on labor rights, intellectual property, SOEs and other behind-the-border issues will either be left out or only lightly addressed.”

However, the RCEP could produce significant economic results. The members represent 49 percent of the world’s population and account for 30 percent of world GDP. It also makes up 29 percent of world trade and 26 percent of world FDI inflows. 

Also, according to a recent study, the FTAAP would result in income gains of about $2 trillion, or nearly 2 percent of the world’s GDP in 2025. The biggest winners would be China, the U.S., Japan, Russia and Korea.

Whichever of these deals is wrapped up first will be the foundation for the next deal and finally the total economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region. Either way it is a win-win situation for Korea.